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## Administrative - Internal Use Only

5 November 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Current Intelligence

SUBJECT : Heart-felt "Concerns"

- 1. My concern is one which I may not be able either to voice or to pen adequately or convincingly.
- 2. It stems from a trend of recent years, as well as from a "concern" as to what a bunch of efficiency experts may do to the intelligence business.
- 3. It is simply this: that by eliminating duplication, by eliminating redundancy, maybe even by eliminating inefficiency, the probability that we will accomplish our principal function may be even more reduced (i.e., our reason for existence: warning against being surprised).
- If substantive responsibilities are overcarefully allocated (e.g., if a single organizational unit is given sole responsibility for an analytical subject) it may be difficult to challenge the analysis and "party lines" are more likely to develop. We may find ourselves in such a position that non-experts will not be possessed of enough information to be able to ask embarrassing questions of the experts. And the experts are not to be trusted. Not with your life or mine. experts said in 1950 that the Chinese would never go into Korea; they said in 1962 the Soviets would be crazy if they took missiles to Cuba; etc., etc., etc. They said all these things for good, sound, logical reasons, which just happened to be wrong-because the world is made up of crazy illogical people who do their best to dissemble their mental conditions.
- 5. We used to have as an insurance policy an indications and warning "system" of sorts. It may not have been very good (I know that because for years I was a fair chunk of it), and it may have been an expensive

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redundancy. But it was there and it enabled the posing of questions to the "experts." And it permitted the uttering of some warnings the "experts" refused to countenance.

- 6. I am now far removed from substance, but as far as I can tell we do not now have (in CIA at least) anything which passes for an indications and warning system. Maybe the Pentagon does but if it does we have, in some effort at logical and efficient allocation of responsibility, surrendured our justification for existence as an institution.
- 7. So all I am saying is this: Don't let "them," in some passion for efficiency and cost-effectiveness and logic, gut the opportunities for duplication, and squabble, and the expression of gut feelings, and the asking of stupid questions by amateurs.
- 8. In a few years I am going to be out there sliding off into oblivion, and I want to be able to do so confident in the feeling that my beloved institution will at least be able to tell my government when my country runs the greatest risk of being sandbagged.

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